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“Feeding “the Beast” 
Nourishing Nativist Appeals in Sweden and Denmark 
 
Anders Hellström1 
Peter Hervik2 
 
 
The news media is tremendously important as a source of knowledge and 
opinion about immigrants, refugees and their descendants.3 The media provides 
a site of public controversy where the cultural foundation of any society can be 
disputed, renegotiated or celebrated. This continuous debate ultimately devolves 
into a question of what knitscitizens together in a separate community of 
inclusion, which simultaneously excludes any group of people who do not 
belong to the community.  
 
The question of what knit citizens together in a distinct, often national, 
community has recently brought strong repercussions in European politics. 
Scholars have devoted attention to a value shift in European societies after the 
Cold War and the coming to the fore of movements (e.g., the Green movement) 
towards postmaterialism (see Minkenberg and Inglehart 1989) that put greater 
emphasis on so-called socio-cultural issues and “life-style politics” rather than 
the socio-economic cleavage between work and capital. On the other side of the 
political spectrum, scholars have identified a backlash to the postulated erosion 
of the link between nationality and citizenship following on from processes 
associated with globalization and the supra-nationalization of the EU. European 
leaders such as Nicolas Sarkozy in France, Angela Merkel in Germany or David 
Cameron in Great Britain all have raised doubts about the prospects of multi-
culturalism in culturally diverse societies.  
 
This complex transformation of European societies has, according to some 
scholars, generated a identity crisis (Ellinas 2010:22) that prompted various 
politicians to restore the linkage between the national people and the national 
territory (Gingrich and Banks 2006), to counter “the fear of the incomplete” and 
                                                          
1  MIM, Malmö University. 
2  CoMID, Aalborg University. 
3  We much appreciate all the relevant feedback provided by Karina Horsti and Susi Meret. 
We are also grateful for all the valuable feedback we received from Anna Bendz on 
earlier drafts of this paper. Thomas Hervik did the extensive coding of the Danish news 
material, for which we are greatly appreciative. Earlier versions of this paper have been 
presented at the Malmö Institue for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare (MIM), 
the Nordic Migration Research conference (NMR) in Malmö, the IMISCOE conference 
in Liège and the annual Political Science conference (SWEPSA) in Gothenburg. We have 
benefitted much from all the valuable comments stemming from these sessions.  
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to reinstall order by means of tightening the boundaries between “us” and 
“them” through references to “identity,” “culture” and “civilization” (Appadurai 
2006; cf. Źiźek 2002).  
 
In this “socio-cultural shift,” issues of national identity are made a source of 
partisan rivalry.This is particularly evident in countries in which the so-called 
Populist Radical Right Parties (RRPs) have made and are making headway 
(Ellinas 2010: 26).4 These parties suggest politics that, generally, disfavour the 
immigrants in relation to the native population (Boréus 2010). To understand the 
complex transformations of European societies following on from this “socio-
cultural shift”, the different roles played by the various RPP-parties in their 
respective national context are essential in this regard.  
 
Aim of the study 
In this paper we shall scrutinize the media exposure of two RRP parties, the 
Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) (SD) in Sweden and the Danish 
People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti ) (DPP) in Denmark. Only recently has a new 
Populist Radical Right Party (RRP), the SD emerged in Sweden on the national 
arena. Its presence has raisedconcernsabout its political influence ─ e.g. whether 
the relationship between the political parties and the news media will be as 
intimately linked in Sweden as it is in Denmark. Conversely, the DPP is a loyal, 
yet demanding, supporter of right-wing coalitionand has governed the 
countrysince 2001 with an unwavering 12-14 per cent of the voters behind 
it.These two countries, withtheir similar socio-political structure, demonstrate 
two distinct discourses on immigration, we argue. Issues pertaining to national 
identity arecommunicated differently in the public debate. Whereas Denmark 
significantly conforms to a broad support for explicit nativist arguments 
(Denmark belongs to the Danes) and nativist policies, Sweden does not do this 
to the same degree.  
 
Kristina Boréus (2010; see also Rydgren 2005) anticipates that the different 
immigration discourses in Sweden and Denmark can be partly explained by the 
long-term presence of the Danish People’s Party in Danish politics, which also 
have had policy implications.5 According to Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup 
(2008), the relative success of the DPPalso relates to the fact that the mainstream 
right-wing parties in Denmark have focused on the immigration issue to win 
governmental power. Our paper highlights, in this regard, the role and position 
                                                          
4  In the scholarly literature, there is neither consensus about the common denominators of 
these parties, nor which parties should be ascribed to the RPP-family (see further Mudde 
2007). 
5  Boréus further demonstrates that in the Swedish 2006 election campaign no strong anti-
immigrant policy positions were proposed by the mainstream parties, although some 
proposals for exclusion were made. 
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of the SD and the DPP in the media exposure of the parties in the political 
competition for electoral support. We will do this, firstly, by means of a 
quantitative overview of the media reporting of the DPP in Denmark and the SD 
in Sweden in the run up to the European Parliamentary (EP) elections of 2004 
and 2009. Secondly, wescrutinize recurrent frames in the media material in 
order to determine the role played by the RRP parties in the public debate and 
the representation of the fine line between the positions of regular political 
adversaries and ‘political beasts’, structured along various stages of party 
development.  
 
Our main argument is that the debate climate in Denmark contributes to support 
for the DPP, although it is not the constitutive reason for its success. If feelings 
of insecurity and xenophobic attitudes are communicated more widely by the 
mainstream parties (including the mainstream press) as something salient and 
actual, this predisposes people to vote for the RRPs (Minkenberg and Perrineau 
2007: 42); a process that has been called a mainstreaming of the radical right 
(Berg and Hervik 2007). An alternative hypothesis suggests that public opinion 
in Sweden is contained by responsible elites and is simplybuilding up pressure 
and waiting to explode. We argue instead that the successful use of nativist 
political rhetoric in the news media enhances the support for the RRPs, which in 
turn makes other parties compete for these votes as well. “Feeding “the 
Beast”[what the late Political Scientist Lise Togeby saw as “the inner swine” 
(1995)] nourishes nativist appeals as well as reactions to these appeals. Unlike 
Togeby however, we do not wish to naturalize the existence of this imagined 
animal, but see it as a cultural figure that grows out of the political rhetoric 
about immigrants, descendants and refugees.  
 
What do we, then, mean by nativist political rhetoric? Nativism holds that the 
nation-state needs to be protected and reserved for the members of the national 
group with the specific aim of consolidating political and cultural homogeneity 
(Mudde 2007:19). Nativist political rhetoric separates between the native and 
the non-native, by means of demarcating the native culture, including the native 
people, the native ideas and values, from what is depicted as alien. The rationale 
behind the nativist message is to maintain that the nation (a distinct territory) 
belongs to the natives (a distinct “people”). In this sense, nativist political 
rhetoric is inclusive and aims to attain greater social cohesion. However, it is 
also highly exclusive as it clearly differentiates between the natives and “the 
others”. In the next section, we will sketch a background to the positions of the 
SD in Swedish politics and the DPP in Danish politics. 
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Background 
Nativism constitutes, together with authoritarianism and populism, a key 
ideological attribute of the RRP party family (see Mudde 2007). Contemporary 
manifestations of nativism are, however, rooted in a long tradition of 
safeguarding the interests of the (native) population.  Sweden and Denmark are 
typically defined as strong universal welfare states with long-lasting Social 
Democratic efforts to control the state, to create a good life for the citizens and 
protect their lives. In these respectsthe SD and the DPP claim to be the adequate 
heirs of the Social Democratic heritage of representing the common people 
against the elite.Conversely, the Social Democrats of today are accused of 
having let the native population down (see Bale et al. 2010, Hellström 2010, 
Marsdal 2008).6 
 
It has become increasingly difficult for the Social Democratic Party to maintain 
the close relation between the people and the elite as a catalyst for progressive 
politics. While this is largely due to the durable governmental position, it also 
has to do with the structural changes in the political competition for votes. Peter 
Mair (2002: 85) points out that the political identities of the mainstream parties 
seem increasingly blurred. This situation invites new political actors to occupy 
an underdog position in relation to the established elites (Kitschelt 2002). In 
turn, the political opportunity structures (increased convergence between the 
mainstream parties; focus also on socio-cultural issues rather than a mere focus 
on socio-economic cleavages; more media attention) are considered favorable 
for new political actors, e.g., the immigrant-skeptics, thus challenging the status 
quo and the Social Democratic dominance in domestic politics (see Ellinas 
2010, Rydgren 2007). 
 
The rise of the RPPs in Denmark and Sweden 
Less than two years after its establishment in October 2005, the Danish People’s 
Party (which had taken the same name as the radical right wing, nationalist and 
anti-Semitic party of 1941-1943) won a stunning 7.4 percent or 13 seats in the 
Parliament in its first national election in 1998. However, in the period 1998–
2001 ithad little influence and was often ignored in the Parliament, since it was 
not considered “house-trained” (stuerene), according to the infamous statement 
made by the then Prime Minister, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. This changed 
drastically in the wake of the new Millennium. Two months after the 9/11 
incident the parliamentary election gave the right wing party, the Danish Liberal 
                                                          
6  There are some important differences between the parties, though. The Danish popular 
movement of peasants and workers created a separate public sphere and a civic society 
independent of the state, which stemmed from the nation’s failure to establish equal 
norms for all its citizens. Conversely, in Sweden the Social Democrats pursued nation 
building through a modernist utopian ideal by uniting the popular movements with the 
state (Berman 2006; Trägårdh 2002). 
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Party (Venstre) a huge victory. The party went on to join forces with the 
Conservatives and the DPP as its supporter. By 2001 it was estimated that most 
Danes and most political establishment shared the view on immigrants, refugees 
and descendants that necessitated a very restrictive policy.  
 
Conversely in Sweden the mainstream parties have traditionally avoided 
conflicts on issues pertaining to national identity and immigration. According to 
Johansson (2008), the mainstream parties in Sweden tend to mobilize voters 
around an image of Sweden as morally superior, particularly through an 
emphasis on state policies on immigration. In this regard, the SD challenges the 
mainstream parties; both the centre-right and the centre-left (See Spång 2008). 
SD has evolved from, in the view of the public eye, a loud organization of angry 
young men with clear Neo-Nazi tinges in the 1980s and the 1990s (with e.g. 
tentacles to the extreme right movement White Arian Resistance) to try 
becoming a party for ‘the common man’, attracting voters from all the other 
parties - including those who abstain from voting (Hellström and Nilsson 2010). 
In 2010, the SD crossed the electoral threshold to the national parliament with 5, 
7 per cent of the voters. In the Swedish political debate the mainstream parties 
are careful not to affiliate with the SD,which means that its position in the 
domestic political fieldis weak. At least up to the 2009 EP electionsthe 
mainstream parties unanimously decided not to co-operate with them and used 
very harsh language against the party. In the rhetorical struggle for electoral 
support, the SD is the card that you least want in your hand (see Hellström and 
Nilsson 2010). In this sense, the mainstream parties frame the SD as ‘“the 
Beast”’ in contemporary Swedish politics; an enemy that we may pass moral 
judgment on and mutually detest.    
 
The SD and the DPP mobilize voters around a core nativist message: Sweden 
belongs to the Swedes and Denmark to the Danes, multi-culturalism endangers 
social cohesion and the religion of Islam is incompatible with native values and 
traditions.Both parties also claim to be friends of the people, in the sense that 
they stand up for the prudent native worker against the elite (cultural, political 
and economic). They accuse the Social Democratic parties for not defending the 
national values against (too much) foreign, especially non-western, influences. 
This said, their positions in the public debate differ.   
 
The analysis 
Our comparative analysis of the media exposure of the DPP in Denmark and the 
SD in Sweden draws on three interlinked dimensions. First, we highlight the 
role of the media as an explanatory factor for why and when the RPP parties 
thrive in different countries at the various stages of party development. Jens 
Rydgren (2004), for instance, suggests that that the cardon sanitaire strategy 
adopted by the Swedish media towards the SD, at least before the 2006 national 
 6
elections, has contributed to its failure to gain seats in the national parliament 
before 2010. Conversely, the Danish media publish articles supported and 
written by the DPP, which then contributed to its electoral fortunes. Following 
Antonis Ellinas (2010: 3), the media plays a crucial role, especially in the 
development phase, i.e. before the ‘new party’ crosses the electoral threshold to 
the national parliament and when it has limited financial and organizational 
resources: ‘The media controls the gateway to the electoral market’ (ibid: 3). 
According to Jens Rydgren (2007: 255), ‘to date there has been no systematic 
study of the role of mass media in the rise of new radical right-wing parties’ in 
Sweden (Rydgren 2007: 255), whereas studies of the parties relationship to the 
media can be seen in Danish media studies (Andreassen 2005, 2007, Hervik 
1999, 2002, 2011). Our comparative analysis of the electoral fortunes of the SD 
and the DPP in relation to their media exposure thus seek to fill this gap, 
emphasizing the role of the media in the competition of the votes (Bevelander 
and Hellström 2011). Recent research on the RPPs (Green-Pedersen and 
Krogstrup 2008, Bale et al. 2010, Mudde 2008 and Jens Rydgren 2010) suggest 
increased scholarly attention to the political competition of the voters and the 
salience of the immigration issue, to understand the emergence and further 
development of the RPPs, rather than a mere focus on the demand for such 
parties, following e.g. periods of crisis.7 
 
Second, then, we wish to explore the differences between the Danish and the 
Swedish discourses on immigration, by means of scrutinizing the different roles 
played by the DPP and the SD in the respective national contexts. To explain the 
various strategies adopted by the mainstream parties to fight back the RPPs on 
the political arena also impinge on the official discourses on immigration. Bale 
et al. (2010) shows how the Social Democratic Parties, traditionally split 
between progressive- and conservative voters, have responded with rather 
different approaches to the challenge of the RPPs, to hold its initial ‘generous’ 
approach; to defuse the immigration issue; to adopt the politics of the RPPs, 
following the dictum: ‘if you cannot beat them, join them’ (ibid: 423). This 
paper thus contributes with a greater understanding of the differences between 
Denmark and Sweden as regards to discourses on national identity, immigration 
and related issues, by means of scrutinizing the reactions to the roles ascribe to 
                                                          
7  Cas Mudde (2008) identifies a paradigmatic shift in the study of populist parties. The 
argument is that most research on RRP-parties has hitherto been devoted to attempts to 
explain why certain voters are attracted to these parties. These explanations range from 
extremism (the view that these parties are antithetical to the core values of liberal 
democracy) and modernism (that RRP only finds fertile ground during periods of crisis). 
According to Mudde, these explanations do not stand up to closer empirical scrutiny, 
since potential voter support for RRP is much larger than is generally accounted for. The 
paradigmatic shift, he concludes, signifies a shift from normal pathology to pathological 
normalcy.  
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the DPP and the SD in the national dynamic of the political competition of the 
votes.  
 
Third, we wish to contribute to the oft-neglected temporal dimension of when 
the RPPs thrive, thus not only where (Meret 2010). Recently, Antonis Ellinas 
(2010) has suggested a two-stage approach – before and after their initial 
electoral breakthrough. In the development phase, before the RPPs have grown 
large enough to play a central role on the electoral market, it is most appropriate 
to focus on the reactions of the mainstream parties whether they, i.e., choose to 
ignore, confront or adjust themselves to the political newcomer. In this phase, 
following Ellinas, the media plays a stronger role in potentially granting 
visibility, or even credibility, to political newcomers and providing them with 
the political opportunities to eventually cross the threshold of relevance, and 
thereby approach mainstream politics.  
 
This phase thus corresponds with the situation of the SD in 2004 and also in 
2009. However, after the initial breakthrough, a phase that applies to the DPP in 
2004 and in 2009, it is more difficult for the mainstream parties to combat the 
political newcomer and the media’s importance may subside in importance once 
the newcomer becomes part of mainstream discourse, Ellinas argues (2010: 18). 
Once the party has crossed the threshold of relevance, it is likely to moderate its 
claims to address a broader audience and the mainstream parties shall find it 
more difficult to ignore these claims. At the latter stage, it gets increasingly 
more important to focus on the internal party arena (cf. Ravik-Jupskås 2011), i.e. 
the organizational capacity of the new parliamentary party whereas the tactical 
maneuvering of the political competitors subsides in importance. Adding the 
comparative dimension, we also recognize the limits of Ellinas’ two-stage 
approach: the SD had neither passed the national electoral threshold in 2004, nor 
in 2009 (though, the DPP did so already in 1998), yet the significance of the SD 
as a serious political contester rose significantly between these periods, most 
distinctively after the 2006 national elections in which the SD gained too few 
votes to cross the national electoral threshold (2, 93 per cent). 
 
Outline 
The analysisis divided into two parts. The first part consists of a quantitative 
overview of the media coverage in 2004 and in 2009 surrounding the elections 
to the EP in Sweden and in Denmark. In part two we highlight the recurrent 
themes in the media material to determine the role played by the RRP parties in 
the public debate. To be more precise, we identify dominant, sometimes 
competing, frames in the public debate as manifested in the national news-
reporting in order to discernthe views and opinions about the SD and DPP and to 
contrast ideas about national identity articulated from different positions in the 
debate. We use a mixed methodology - quantitative content analysis and 
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qualitative frame analysis - to come to terms with the issue at stake; the different 
discourses on immigration in Sweden and in Denmark and the different 
functions and roles played by the SD and the DPP in the national political 
contexts. 
 
“The Beast” 
By acknowledging the different positions played by the SD and the DPP in the 
Swedish and Danish political context, we assume that the positioning of these 
parties fluctuates from regular political adversaries to “political beasts.” In this 
regard, we recognize a shift from the latter to the former in the national news 
reporting from 2004 to 2009. We understand the figure of “the Beast” to be an 
endemic force that triggers mutual moral disapproval among the established 
political actors, someone (or something) that “the good democrats” can pass 
moral judgments on and unite against. “the Beast” triggers fear and unanimous 
resistance. “the Beast”, as a political actor, not only articulates the wrong views, 
but also represents an “evil type.”8 
 
In popular culture, monsters tend to be both fearsome and evil. We suggest that 
“the political Beast” represents less of an incarnation of the evil and more of a 
horrendous presence that challengesharmony and established social hierarchies 
(see Kearney 2002: 99). In this respect, “the Beast” is not an ordinary political 
opponent but a political antagonist that needs to be cast off or out; rather like the 
figure of the scapegoat that is constructed to save the city/state from sin (See 
Culler 1994: 143). 
 
According to Slavoj Źiźek (2000), the RPP party FPÖ (Die Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs), then chaired by the reputable Jörg Haider, that won a seat in the 
national government in 2000 with approximately 27 per cent of the votes behind 
it, played a particular role in European politics. Finally, Źiźek argues, the 
mainstream parties found someone to mutually hate and debar. In a corporativist 
political culture in which the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the leading 
Conservative Party (ÖVP) together had governed Austria for several years, FPÖ 
                                                          
8  Zygmunt Bauman (2007: 65) aptly notes that “the evil” and “the fear” are Siamese twins, 
or two separate names for the same experience. The evil, following Bauman (as the liquid 
fear), is frightening because it destabilizes the cognitive frames that make the world 
appear comprehensive and structured. The secular evil, Bauman continues, is a product of 
modernity, of totalitarian rationalism covered with reason, enacted by humans –such as 
the Nazi perpetrator Alfred Eichmann in the post war trials – who is said to have acted out 
of reason. The face of evil, inspired by Hannah Arendt, takes on the less monstrous figure 
of the prudent service man, only claiming to answer to the orders given by his employers. 
In this respect, our approach relates to an understanding of politics as something more 
than the mere mobilization of interests ─ as the left-right cleavage covers, to also consider 
the mobilization of passions and frustrations as an imminent feature of democratic politics 
(see Hellström 2010, Laclau 2005, Mouffe 2005; Canovan 1999).  
 9
(and Haider)was afforded the role of “the Beast”; someone (or something) that 
the EU-149 could abandon and distance itself from. At the same time, its 
presence injected a sense of dynamic in the political field (see Hellström 2005; 
Hellström 2010; cf. Hagelund 2003).  
 
We will refer to “the Beast” as an analytical category that shows different faces 
in different contexts. Defined as something or someone that the mainstream 
parties and the mainstream press unanimously reject and mutually debar, this 
category makes an object of passionate controversy in the public debate, 
generating repulsion and moral indignation. Our hypothesis would be that the 
SD is more akin to play this role in the Swedish debate, whereas in the Danish 
debate we expect to find other objects of moral indignation among the 
mainstream parties, as the DPP in fact has supported the centre-right 
governmental coalition since 2001; i.e.  the framing of “the Beast” differs 
between Sweden and Denmark.  
 
Framing 
In this article we draw on frame analysis to reveal views and attitudes that affect 
popular opinion and voters’ support for the RRP parties. In this context, framing 
refers to the manner in which the media organizes communication in order to 
invoke a certain interpretation in the reader, such as voter support. We assume 
that media exposure and framing affects popular opinion, whether this be 
problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation or the 
recommendation for certain action to take place (Entman 1993: 52).10 Even if 
journalists comply with the news genre’s rules of objectivity, a journalistic 
articlestillengagesa story by means of selection and thus presents certain aspects 
as more salient than others.11 
 
Since framing is selective and varies in the saliency assigned to stories, we take 
it that framing operates differently in the Danish and the Swedish news media. 
Whereas major newspapers in Sweden tend to be in mutual agreement about not 
siding with the SD, the situation in Denmark is more complex, given that some 
                                                          
9  The EU-14 stands for the then member-states of the European Union, with the exception 
of Austria, that decided to boycott Austria from bi-lateral deliberations. Anniken 
Hagelund (2003) argues in a similar vein that in the 1999 national elections the 
Norwegian RRP party, ‘The Progress Party’, represented the indecent other in Norwegian 
politics, thus providing the negative meaning to the ‘decency’ of the mainstream parties 
(see also Hellström and Nilsson 2010). 
10 Frames only make sense against a more comprehensive background of cultural 
knowledge, organized as figured worlds or cultural models – the subject of which is 
beyond the remit of this article.  
11  In addition, editorial writers, various experts and political representatives might exercise 
control of public opinion in editorials, chronicles and debate articles; i.e., to determine the 
major manifestations of public opinion and popular will (Entman 1993: 57).  
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newspapers, e.g.,Jyllands-Posten and Ekstra Bladet, occasionally applaud DPP 
initiatives. Furthermore, the DPP is now an established political actor in 
Denmark,while the SD balances on the fringe of the acceptable. In the 2010 
national elections as the SD entered the national parliament, Swedish 
newspapers now have to recognize that voters chose to vote for the party. 
 
We shall scrutinize competing frames around the construction of the nature of 
“the Beast” in the media coverage; frames about strategies how to render “the 
Beast” harmless and frames that provide explanations for why “the Beast” 
remains attractive. We will assess the fine line between the morally accepted 
position of regular political adversary and rebukablepolitical beast, arguing that 
the DPP is framed closer to the former position than the SD, especially in 2004. 
Before dwelling further into this issue, we will turn to the initial quantitative 
overview of the positioning of the DPP in Denmark and the SD in Sweden. 
From our initial argument follows that the acceptance of nativist rhetoric and 
politics are more accepted in Denmark than in Sweden, in turn, we hypothesize 
that the linguistic tone used towards the DPP in Denmark differs from how the 
Swedish newspapers talk about the SD (both in 2004 and 2009), and 
secondly,that the Danish newspapers frame DPP views in a more positive and 
balanced way, compared to Swedish news reporting of the SD (both in 2004 and 
in 2009).  
 
Quantitative overview 
The body of material in our study consists of 573 articles fromfive Danish and 
five Swedish newspapers.12 We identified the articles by searching the Swedish 
media database Mediearkivet and its Danish counterpart Infomedia.13  The 
analysis covers the news reporting in two specific periods: 2004 (13/4/2004-
13/10/2004) and 2009 (7/4/2009-7/10/2009).14 Table 1 shows that very few 
articles deal with the SD in 2004, though evenly spread between the newspapers. 
                                                          
12  The criterion used to select the newspapers is based on the circulation rate. The material 
includes both dailies and tabloids.   
13  We have thus not attempted to cover the whole debate on immigration during this period, 
but have limited ourselves to the SD and DPP debates on these issues, including 
perceptions of the people and popular attitudes.  
14  For the Swedish case, we chose the articles included in the sample using the following 
search criterion:  Sweden Democrats AND (svenskar OR folk* OR väljare OR muslim* 
OR invandrar* OR Europaparlament* OR integration). For the Danish case, we used the 
following search criterion: Danish People’s Party AND integration* AND Indvandre* 
eller muslim* OG eu OR folk* OR vælger* OR dansker*. We have also elaborated a 
common coding scheme (see Appendix 2), and developed more detailed coding 
instructions in order to strengthen the reliability for each separate study. For this purpose, 
we also conducted a preliminary coding to set the parameters for the full inquiry. In the 
coding scheme we also included a set of variables relating to different perceptions of the 
people, although only a limited number of articles addressed these concerns.  
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Almost half of the articles in Sweden and more than 60 percent in Denmark are 
news articles, and the remaining material is divided into chronicles, op-eds and 
editorials. This selection of articles corresponds with the trend towards more 
opinionated news-material.15 
In 2004 the SD was still a marginal phenomenon in Swedish politics and was 
positioned in the murky domains of the far right. However, after its relative 
success in the general election of 2006, news coverage expanded rapidly and has 
continued to do so (see Appendix 1). In Denmark, the DPP was already an 
established actor in 2004 and there is therefore no such discrepancy between 
2004 and 2009.  
 
Table 1. Sources of Data, Swedish newspapers 
 News 
article/News 
item 
Chronicle Editorial Op-eds Total 2004 2009 
Expressen 25 29 16 6 68 11 57 
Dagens Nyheter 38 39 17 8 76 7 69 
Svenska Dagbladet 26 17 3 2 43 3 40 
Aftonbladet 22 1 0 6 44 6 38 
Göteborgsposten 32 1 6 6 62 7 55 
Total 143 87 42 28 293 34 259 
 
Table 2. Sources of Data, Danish newspapers 
 News 
article/News 
item 
Chronicle Editorial Op-eds Total 2004 2009 
Jyllands-Posten 68 29 0 0 97 65 32 
Politiken 46 39 3 2 90 43 47 
Berlingske 
Tidende 
43 17 3 0 63 30 33 
Ekstra Bladet 12 1 1 1 15 6 9 
B.T 15 1 6 0 22 17 5 
Total 184 87 13 3 293 161 126 
 
                                                          
15  According to Karina Horsti (2010), newspapers are increasingly used for communicating 
views, rather than mere news. 
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In the 2004 EP elections in Sweden the Social Democrats were in a government 
position. Most of the mainstream parties lost considerable electoral supportin the 
elections, while the new EU-skeptic party, Juni-listan, gained more than 14 
percent of the votes. The SD did not gain more than approximately one 
percent,however. The 2009 elections were quite a contrast. EU-sceptic parties 
lost electoral ground and instead a new party, the Pirate Party, gained two seats 
in the EP, emphasizing questions of integrity and internet independency. The SD 
almost tripled its votes from the previous elections in 2004, though, and was 
also constantly exposed by the news media agenda which – all things considered 
- may have generated more voting support (Ellinas 2010).  
 
In the Danish 2004 EP elections, the Social Democrats (five seats) and the 
mainstream right party Venstre (three seats) together acquired more than 50 
percent of the total votes. The DPP marginally raised its share from 5.5 to 6.8 
percent. In the 2009 elections in Denmark almost 60 percent of the voters went 
to the polls (over 10 percent more than in the previous elections), which made it 
the third highest voting figure in the EU. Together with the Socialist People’s 
Party, which doubled its votes from the previous elections, the DPP was the 
main victor with more than 15 percent of the voters behind it.   
 
Language 
“The Beast” is someone or something alien to the mainstream parties. Is it, then, 
the case that the DPP and the SD are presented as very different to the 
mainstream parties, or does the national media coverage instead portray these 
parties as fairly, or even very similar to the mainstream parties?16 Table 3 shows 
that almost half of the articlesin Sweden frame the SD as very different to the 
mainstream parties and almost three quarters of the articles (73.7 percent) frame 
the SD as either fairly or very different from the other parties. In Denmark only 
2 percent of the articles frame the DPP as very different (28 percent as fairly 
different) compared to the mainstream parties.17 
 
                                                          
16  We use a five-range scale to code articles about SD and the DPP as 1) (alien to/very 
different from the traditional parties); 2) (fairly different); 3) (balanced, both different and 
similar); 4) (fairly similar); 5) (very similar). In practical terms, e.g. articles that very 
clearly separate between the traditional parties, on the one hand, and the RPPs on the 
other hand, are thus coded as ‘very different’ on this variable. On the other side, e.g. 
articles that suggest that e.g. the traditional party X now has imitated the politics of the 
SD (or the DPP) or vice versa are coded as fairly similar, or even very similar depending 
on the content, and the language used (e.g. ‘which adjectives’ are ascribed to the RPPs). 
Coding the material, we have also let a ‘second reader’ code a limited amount of articles, 
to control for reliability.   
17  We use a five-range (1-5) scale to code articles that present the DPP or the SD from 1) 
(alarming threat/made fun of/very negative), 2) (fairly negative), 3) 
(balanced/neutral/both positive and negative), 4) (fairly positive) to 5) (very positive).  
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or very positive tone towards the party (1 out of 10) in 2009 compared to 2004. 
It is also interesting to note that more articles use a fairly- or very negative tone 
towards the DPP (approximately 45 percent) compared to 2004. While the 
DPPis certainly a prominent voice in the Danish debate, it is controversial and 
often criticized. Our quantitative measurements indicate that the SD was 
attributed to the role of “the Beast” in the 2004 elections (perceived as very 
different and attributed to very negative remarks in the limited exposure). 
However, in 2009 it approached the position of becoming a regular political 
adversary.  
 
In Sweden, all the newspapers (including the tabloids) take a firm stance against 
the SD, at least in the editorials and on the cultural pages. In Denmark, the 
media landscape is more divided. In Sweden the tabloids, predominantly 
Aftonbladet, tend to be more negative towards the SD compared to the daily 
papers. Also in “neutral” genres, SD is frequently described as an alarming 
threat (see e.g.,Aftonbladet 26 May 2009), or at least portrayed in a negative 
way. We could also add that more than 3 out of 4 editorials use a very- or fairly 
negative tone towards the SD, whereas approximately 6 out of 10 news articles 
use a balanced tone.  
 
In Denmark, Politiken adopts a rather negative tone towards the DPP (more than 
half of the articles are either fairly- or very negative), whereas Jyllands-Posten 
tends to be more positive than negative. Berlingske Tidene and B.T. are 
somewhere in between, whereas Ekstra Bladet is more similar to Jyllands-
Posten in this regard. More than 7 out of 10 news articles use a balanced tone 
towards the DPP, whereas the editorials and the chronicles, perhaps less 
surprisingly, use a wider spectrum of negative and positive remarks to describe 
the party. In comparison with the Swedish case, only 4 out of 10 editorials use a 
very- or fairly negative tone towards the DPP.  
 
The SD is both framed as ‘very different/alien’ to the other parties and is 
portrayed very negatively as e.g., an “alarming threat”; i.e. “a political Beast” - 
an extremist party with extremist views. There is reason to assume that articles 
that adopt a very negative tone towards the SD/the DPP also try to distance 
themselves and the mainstream parties from the RRP parties - to demarcate the 
“decent parties” (regular political adversaries) from the “extreme right” (the 
political Beast). We therefore decided to test the relation between the degree of 
difference and journalistic tone. Is it the case that those using a very negative 
tone towards the SD and DPP also consider the parties to be quite distinct from 
the mainstream parties?  
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Table 7. Degree of difference and journalistic tone, number of articles (percent) in 
Sweden, 2004 and 2009. 
Journalistic 
Tone/Degree of 
Difference 
Very 
Similar/Fairly 
Similar  
Neutral/Balanced Very 
different/Fairly 
Different 
Total 
Very 
Negative/Fairly 
Negative 
18 (62.1) 13 (44. 8) 55 (83.3) 86 
Balanced/Neutral 11 (37.9) 16 (55.2) 11 (16.7) 38 
Total 29 (100) 29 (100) 66 (100) 124 
 
Table 8. Degree of difference and journalistic tone, number of articles (percent) in 
Denmark, 2004 and 2009. 
Journalistic 
Tone/Degree of 
Difference 
Very 
Similar/Fairly 
Similar 
Neutral/Balanced Very 
Different/Fairly 
Different 
 
Very 
Negative/Fairly 
Negative 
14 (46.7) 10 (15.6) 8 (17.8) 32  
Balanced/Neutral 16 (53.3) 48 (75) 17 (37.8) 81  
Fairly 
Positive/Very 
Positive 
0 (0) 6 (9.4) 20 (44.4) 26  
Total 30 (100) 64 (100) 45 (100) 129  
 
The results indicate that articles that frame the SD as different to a great extent 
also (83.3 percent) use a fairly negative/very negative tone towards the party. It 
can also be noted that articles that frame the SD as similar to the other parties to 
some extent also frame itwith more negative than positive wording (62.1 
percent). In the first case, at an aggregated level the SD is framed more or less as 
an anomaly or as contributing to the destabilization of mainstream politics. The 
problem is regarded as the SD and what the party is said to represent. The 
remedy to this challenge is that the mainstream parties should do everything in 
their power to debar the party from formal influence. In the second case, an 
alternative frame suggests that the problem is that the mainstream parties copy 
SD politics and views. An editorial in Expressen (8 May 2009) by Ann-
Charlotte Martéus is illustrative of the first position, though she is also 
concerned about the compromising forces in mainstream politics: 
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Two forces guide the Sweden Democrats: hatred of foreigners and thirst for 
power. The rest is emptiness, concealed by sentimental national romanticism. 
It is not possible to compromise with that potion. You cannot and you may 
not. The only decent thing to do is to remain a counter force.  
 
Other voices tend to stress the similarities between the SD and the traditional 
parties, such as the journalist Isobel Hadley-Kamptz who (Expressen 13 June 
2009, op-ed): “The established parties conform, in principal, to the SD-idea that 
Sweden was better off before, something which constrains them in all 
discussions.” 
 
In the Danish news reporting, the articles that frame the DPP as different only to 
a low degree employ a negative tone towards the party (17.8 percent). 
Conversely, 46.7 percent of the articles that posit the DPP as similar employ a 
negative tone towards the party, and among those that posit the DPP as different, 
44.4 percent of the articles use a fairly- or very positive tone. The results show 
that articles that frame the DPP as similar to the established parties also tend to 
use a negative tone towards the DPP. We can understand this in the light of the 
DPP’s role as government supportive party, which implies that negative 
criticism of the DPPis sometimes akin to explicit criticism of the government’s 
politics:  
 
The main reason for the upbeat coverage and debate in the Danish media is 
political: The Danish People’s Party has made Islam and Muslims a central 
theme in the so-called war of values, which has unfortunately rubbed off on 
the other parties with the government in the lead. The theme is therefore itself 
the foundation of the political power in Denmark. This is a sad and polarizing 
development of the society, but it is almost impossible for the media to 
downgrade an area, which has such a high political attention (Birthe Rønn 
Hornbech, Politiken 9 May 2009, commentary). 
 
Contrary to what we expected,articles that frame the DPP as fairly or very 
different tend to use a positive tone towards the DPP. This result indicates that 
the DPP, despite its strong position in domestic politics, is sometimes attributed 
to the position of a radical and invigorating underdog. Certainly, the DPP feeds 
on that image. In its response to an appeal to participate in the celebration of 
Ramadan at Christiansborg,19 the party makes a clear statement (Jyllands-Posten 
15 September 2009): 
                                                          
19  Christiansborg is a castle in Copenhagen that houses the Danish Parliament, Folketinget, 
and other important political institutions. By way of comparison, traditionally, all the 
Party leaders who are represented in the national parliament are invited to attend the 
annual Nobel Prize ceremony. After its entry in the Swedish Parliament in 2010, 
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… all members of the Parliament have received a written invitation, but none 
from the DPP has accepted it. And that is no coincidence, explains the party’s 
spokesperson on social affairs, Marin Henriksen. He says: ’It is absolutely 
crazy, and one should ask oneself, whether this is not an expression of 
misperceived integration, when you use the facilities of Christiansborg to 
mark a Muslim religious celebration. 
 
Dominant Frames 
So far we have verified the proposition that the Swedish newspapers use a more 
negative tone towards the SD in Sweden compared to the Danish media’s 
framing of the DPP. We notice a difference in time in the sense that the Swedish 
newspapers tend to apply a relatively more neutral tone when they define and 
discuss the SD in 2009 compared to 2004. These results were expected and 
correspond well with the various stages of the party development of the SD and 
the DPP, as well as to the different discourses on immigration in Sweden and in 
Denmark. However, we have yet to explore the dominant meanings in the 
communicative texts, and intend to do this by identifying different frames of 
interpretation in the newspapers. We do not by any means suggest that the 
frames are absolute. They co-exist and are unfolded or compressed to different 
degrees, often in the same statement. Nevertheless, the separation of frames 
helps us to produce a better sense of which frames are in play, and which ones 
are weak and strong. We identify the frames by means of condensing recurrent 
claims in the media material. In this sense, the frames refer to a set of claims that 
are repeatedly used and returned to in the public debate.  
 
This second section is divided into three parts. The first part concerns frames 
that answer the question: what is the nature of “the Beast”? How is “the Beast” 
constructed in the two national settings? What faces does it show? Is it the case 
that the SD/ DPP is defined as an anomaly in contemporary Swedish 
politics/Danish politics or is it the case that these RRP parties are defined and 
recognized as regular/normal/normalized political adversaries?20 
 
The second part concerns different frames that answer the question: how to 
contain“the Beast”? If recognized as a problem, whatis then the solution to the 
RRP parties’ progress in Sweden and Denmark? In this regard, mainstream 
political actors use different strategies to either ban or copy RRP policies. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
however, Jimmie Åkesson (the leader of the SD) did not receive a letter of invitation from 
the Nobel Foundation.   
20  We start this section by considering frames on the RPPs as ‘Political Beasts, though in the 
Danish case, in the debate on the DPPs, we soon came across other frames, hinting at yet 
another Beast in the public debate; i.e. “Islam”.  
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Additionally, what frames, in the media coverage, are invoked to fight back 
other kinds of Beasts? 
 
The third part concerns different frames that answer the question: why is “the 
Beast” so attractive? This section involves frames that define and discuss what 
constitutes a fertile soil for the further progression (and possible decline) of the 
RRP parties in Sweden and in Denmark. This also opens for frames that 
construe the attractive force of other potential Beasts, especially so in contexts 
where the RPPs are considered tamed into regular adversaries.  
 
The nature of “the Beast”: Sweden.  
In 2004 the public debate in Sweden demonstrated a unanimous framing of the 
SD as the unwelcome Beast. By 2009, however, the SD was no longer itself an 
object of news coverage and indignation. One strong frame does persist in the 
media coverage, though, which is that the SD represents a devil in disguise. 
Underneath the polished facade they are still the same xenophobic 
movement.According to an editorial in Expressen (8 April 2009): “Surely the 
Swedish Democratic right arm still gives a twitch, even if it is nowadays tugged 
in a Dressman-suit instead of an armlet.” 
In this frame, the SD ambition to moderate its image is discredited.  However, a 
second equally strong frame suggests that the SD ideological message is 
embedded in a deeply rooted nationalist tradition of protecting the People’s 
Home against nonnative elements; hence, a party that attracts discontented 
Social Democrats who are concerned about the deterioration of the Welfare 
State. They feed on a perception that “we” (as in “we” the native Swedes) were 
better off before. Some commentators, such as the journalist Dilsa Demirback-
Sten in Expressen (7 August 2008, op-ed) even suggest that: “If it was not for 
the xenophobia, their programme could be any badly prepared collage of ideas, 
in the spirit of the ‘People’s Home’, intended to illustrate the excellence of the 
welfare state.” In this frame, the SD is radically (some would say extremely) 
nationalistic.   
Finally, the third frame that defines the nature of the SD locates the party closer 
to the bourgeoisie camp. In a debate article (Dagens Nyheter 17 September 
2009), the leader of the Christian Democrats (KD), Göran Hägglund, construesa 
populist divide between the people and the elite and suggests that he represents 
“the reality people” who are constantly sidestepped by a radical elite who refuse 
to accommodate the views and interests of “ordinary people.” This article, with 
its rather explicit populist appeal, provoked several critical comments, an 
editorial in Expressen (18 September 2009) says: 
 
Wake up, Göran, you are in the government! You cannot attack “the elite” 
from an underdog perspective. You are the Minister for Social Affairs, lad. 
You make propositions that become laws that decide what “common people” 
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should do. You are part of the elite, Göran Hägglund. And you are obviously 
prepared to play on vulgar populist strings to remain in power.   
 
In another editorial in Expressen (8 July 2009), it is suggested that Hägglund’s 
populist rhetoric about the need to confront real problems instead of discussing 
gender issues, queer theories or depraving norms is very similar to that of the 
SD. The SD radicalizes populist demands of social cohesion also articulated by 
the mainstream parties. Hence, this frame suggests that the SD consists of 
radical populists, though not extremists.  
 
In the news reporting on the SD, the party is akin to the figure of the political 
Beast in contemporary Swedish politics. Some commentators warn that this 
Beast is about to change into a Trojan Horse in Swedish politics, just like the 
DPP in Denmark, though. The journalist Ronnie Sandahl claims that:  
 
For a long time the major Danish parties saidthat they refused to collaborate 
with the Danish People’s Party. This is exactly what the Swedish 
parliamentary parties in Sweden say today […] It did not take long. Now 
most parties are firm critics of immigration [in Denmark] (Aftonbladet 31 
August 2009).  
 
The nature of “the Beast”: Denmark  
In Denmark the DPPbecame an established fact in the election of 2001 when the 
party became the supporting cast of the government. Instead of the party being 
the object of news, a substantial number of themes have emerged as the outcome 
of political initiatives. Ideas like the banningof the burqa, marriage restrictions 
betweenclose relatives (cousins or parents’ cousins), and parents sending their 
children to far away countries to be re-educated,all became dominant media 
themes that were not backed up by surveys, factual evidence or background 
analysis. The re-education stay is a theme that has popped up in the tabloids 
every June since 1999, but always flounders due to a lack of evidence (see for 
instance Hervik 2002). The ban on the burqa was proposed by the Conservatives 
as part of an effort to re-emphasize the party’s active role in the war of cultural 
values and to compete for votes. Representing Muslims as a danger creates fear 
and allows a party to present itself as a hero that defends democracy through 
restrictive identity politics against the Muslim presence (Berlingske Tidende 22 
August 2009, see also Betz and Meret 2009).  
 
The nature of “the Beast” is ambivalent. One frame in the Danish news reporting 
suggests that the DPP, rather than being seen as a Beast, is regarded as a regular 
political adversary. Voters who are currently attracted to the DPP may have 
voted for other parties in the past and these parties now seek to lure them back to 
the fold through political appeals. Some members of the Conservative Party 
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united in an informal network to distance their party from the DPP. Peter Norsk, 
a member of the party’s board, maintains that: ”We make up an informal 
network of people, who believe that we should no longer compete with the 
Danish People’s Party in talking rubbish about Muslims” (Jyllands-Posten 14 
February 2010).  
 
Rhetoric that begins with a direct criticism of DPP often ends up sharing views 
and policies, however. One example is the New Alliance (Ny Alliance), which 
moved away from the Social Liberals (Det Radikale Venstre) with an enough-is-
enough agenda (nok-er-nok) referring to the lack of direct criticism and 
resistance of the Danish People’s Party’s anti-immigrant rhetoric. However, its 
leader – who originally claimed that the party was established as a guarantee of 
a resistance to the DPP – joined the Conservatives within two years. Berlingske 
Tidende (18 September 2009) suggested that his ideas about this and related 
matters were identical to those of the DPP.   
 
The media coverage in both periods reveals a political competition in which 
similarities between the DPP and the mainstream parties are highlighted. The 
DPP shares common values with Venstre (Politiken 23 September 2006; 
Politiken 28 April 2007) and individuals such as Naser Khader (Member of the 
Conservatives in 2009, Social Liberal in 2004), Lene Espersen (C), and Karen 
Espersen (V),in being encouraged to join DPP on account of their anti-Muslim 
proposals (Jyllands-Posten 19 August 2009; Ekstra Bladet 19 August 2009; 
Ekstra Bladet 17 February 2009, see also Ekstra Bladet 3 September 2000). 
Criticism of the DPP is often a criticism of the government and even of the 
Social Democrats, since they support many of the proposals on integration 
(Jyllands-Posten 17 August 2009). A sub-frame that emerges from a news 
analysis is that the DPP owns the immigrant-refugee issue. “The debate is 
pushed to the edge of what can be implemented. And here the DPP always 
wins” (B.T. 19 August 2009), and “A debate about immigrants and refugees 
always, always! benefits the DPP. No one can pass them on the right side.” 
(Politiken 28 August 2009.  
 
Mainstream actors produce counter frames that construct the DPP through its 
extreme nature, thus a second less dominating frame suggests that the 
DPPstands for Extreme Nationalism. When referringto former “good guys” 
among the Conservatives and Venstre, Svend Auken (S) writes: “At that time 
there was no flirting with the DPP and radical right-wing populism” (Jyllands-
Posten 10 August 2004).In addition, Mogens Lykketoft, also from the Social 
Democratic Party, declared in the annual meeting that: “Some would say we 
have taken over right-wing attitudes towards foreigners and integration. This is 
totally wrong. We find it despicable when DPP and Venstre pursue a politics 
based on biases and fear” (Jyllands-Posten 10 September 2004).  
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For those who have experienced a strong anti-Semitic tone, which 
characterized the Nazis, then I can understand, if they see some connection 
between the way DPP talks about foreigners and immigrants and the way that 
certain groups were earlier targets of derogatory speech (Bald cit. in Jyllands-
Posten 10 September 2004).  
 
However, these statements are fairly benign compared to the DPP’s own words 
and objectives. Pia Kjærsgaard writes: “The solution is that large numbers of 
foreigners must be sent home and this repatriation will be the DPP’s most 
important political theme in the coming years” (Berlingske Tidende 26 July 
2004). In the 2009 sample we occasionally find other slogan-like utterances, 
such as: “The Danish People’s Party is the occupational force, we are the 
resistance movement” (Politiken 23 August 2009) and “I will not comment on 
the Danish People’s Party’s anti-Islamic, xenophobic and at times racist politics, 
because everyone knows their attitudes” (Politiken 9 September 2009).  
 
A third frame, referred to as “the Beast” is Islam, is arguably the most dominant 
frame in Denmark. During the debate at the opening of the Danish Parliament in 
October 2001, Pia Kjærsgaard declared war against Islam. Although she was 
reprimanded by the party leader, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, (Venstre), they 
joined forces a few months later in a governmental collaboration that was based 
on the same idea but with a slightly less direct tone. Yet, Lene Espersen’s 
declaration about Islam being the greatest threat of all in the world (Christian 
Hüttemeier, Politiken 16 August 2009, see also Metro-Express 23 April 2009) 
kept the image of what the real Beast is about alive. Mogens Camre, an MEP 
representing the DPP, said: “Because of their culture Muslims are a big problem 
in Western countries. Few of them want integration, since they have come with 
a culture, which they believe must conquer the world” (Berlingske Tidende 1 
June 2004). Others simply noted that: “Today most Muslim immigrants feel 
unwanted. They experience that the number of people with Islam critical and 
racist attitudes is increasing. Many are tired of the comparison between Islam 
and terrorism” (Knudsen et al. Politiken 9 May 2009).  
   
The nature of “the Beast” in Denmark makes up two weak frames and a strong, 
dominant one. The DPP is not identified as radically different in Denmark as it 
is in Sweden. It is spoken of as a political opponent (first frame) and a party of 
extremist views (second frame); particularly its view of human nature 
(menneskesyn). “The Beast” is not the party, but Islam (third frame). Of course 
there are those in Sweden who articulate a similar message, although – in 
general – theyrepresent a marginal position; such as the SD representatives 
themselves. Conversely, in Denmark actors who talk from a legitimate and a 
more privileged position also communicate a similar message. In this frame, 
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“the Beast” is Muslim and non-western migrants whose culture, values, beliefs, 
attitudes and identity are regarded as incompatible with the distinct Danish 
culture (Betz and Meret 2009). They are to be controlled (see e.g., Berlingske 
Tidende 20 April 2004). Their numbers must be limited and the number of new 
migrants coming in should be carefully monitored. “the Beast” is “the others”; 
those who are also the object of restrictive policies.  
 
How to contain“the Beast”: Sweden.  
The SD is widely recognized as a problem in the public debate in Sweden. 
Political groups of various kinds mobilize to obstruct the SD from gaining seats 
in the national parliament.  In 2004 this was not really an issue, since at that 
timethe party was not recognized as a potential threat. However, in 2009 it could 
be argued that the question of how to confront the SD became a political issue in 
its own right. Some champion the freedom of speech to engage in open dialogue 
with the party, whereas e.g., the editorial writer Lena Andersson suggests 
(Dagens Nyheter 17 September 2009, editorial pages) that: “To remove the 
famous cover and let the hatred boil over will only lead to more contempt and 
brutality, as the Danish example shows.” 
 
In a survey of the Swedish members of the national parliament only three 
percent preferred to meet the SD with silence, whereas a majority of 59 percent 
instead wanted to engage in open debates with the party (Göteborgs-Posten17 
August 2009). Evidently, there are two distinct frames here about how to contain 
“the Beast”: with silence or with open dialogue. However, the SD press 
secretary, Jens Leandersson (ibid), shared his view about what the open dialogue 
approach has implied in practice: “It is as though everyone is talking about 
Santa Claus without anyone ever actually seeing him. The parties say they are 
willing to engage in the debate because that is the answer that one is expected to 
give, but after that nothing happens.” 
  
Another frame that is related to how to contain“the Beast” is the strategy of 
taming. If the mainstream parties also recognize the “problems” of integration 
and immigration, discontented voters may yet again consider the mainstream 
party to be a valid option in the forthcoming elections. The Conservative Party 
(Moderaterna) (M), asked a special committee to lay out the contours for a new 
immigration policy. In their report, the committee chose to: “face the truth” and 
recommended a “balanced view of the multicultural reality.”According to the 
Conservative Party, integration politics had, shifted from almost assimilationist 
politics to misguided caring (The New Moderates (De nya moderaterna) 2009: 
6; see also Hellström 2010: 147-149). This frame suggests that, ”we” (as in 
“we” the mainstream actors) must seriously consider the “real” problems with 
the reverse side of integration; otherwise voters may turn to the SD.  If “the 
Beast” cannot easily be demolished, this frame suggests transforming “the 
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Beast” into a pet. In Denmark, the strategy of taming has been used for quite 
some time.  
 
How to contain“the Beast”: Denmark.  
The Social Democratic Party, the Socialistic People’s Party, and the Red-Green 
Alliance lost a substantial number of voters to the Danish People’s Party in the 
1998 and 2001 parliamentary elections. Ever since then these parties in 
particular have tried to recapture the voters. There is general agreement that if 
the parties use words like“nationalism” and “racism”, criticism easily backfires 
and more voters risk joining the DPP, since they fear a new tolerance of non-
Western migrants. If, on the other hand, “the Beast” is seen as being Islam and 
Islamism, this frame suggests that the way to combat these is through restrictive 
policy and zero-tolerance practice.  
 
It is not only the government parties that support the DPP ban on Muslims. The 
Social Democrats also support new legislation e.g., against the wearing of the 
burqa in public places: “We cannot ban what people wear at home. There you 
can be naked or wear the burqa. But the Social Democrats support banning it the 
moment you step out of the front door, says political spokesman Henrik Sass-
Larsen” (Ekstra Bladet 17 August 2009).  
 
As mentioned earlier, the Social Democrats changed their opinion when it was 
discoveredthat a ban would be unconstitutional. While Social Democrats 
rhetorically speak against the Danish People’s Party and the government, in the 
end they often vote for many of their proposed policies. For its part, the DPP 
generally supports the government because the government is intent on carrying 
out restrictive policies: 
 
If the government does not guarantee a restrictive immigrant policy, the DPP 
threatens to endits close collaboration with the government. The restrictive 
immigration policy is the reason why we support the government of Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen. In principle there are no other reasons, says DPP foreign 
policy spokesman, Søren Espersen to Ritzau. (Danish Radio 22 July 2008)  
 
The most dominant frame on how to deal with the “first Beast”, the DPP, is 
through verbal resistance, whereas the “second Beast”, Islam, and to some 
extent non-western migrants, is to suggest and support restrictive migration 
policies such as those of the government. In the fear of losing votes, few dare to 
question these policies. There also seems to be a consensual agreement about the 
need to support and sustain national values, the national cultural canon, and 
citizenship testing.  
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Why “the Beast” is so attractive: Sweden and Denmark.  
The bestiality of “the Beast” is attractive in a political landscape in which the 
differences between right and left vaporize, at least in the public eye (Mouffe 
2005). Depicting something (or someone) as a “Beast” is a wayof augmenting 
moral values in the field of politics. “The Beast” is attractive in the eyes of the 
political antagonists because it represents the moral evil that “we” (as in “we, 
the members of the mainstream parties) condemn and can mobilize against.” 
Following Richard Kearney (2002: 121): “What monsters reveal (monstrare) to 
us is nothing less than our craving to put a face on phobia.”The obvious side-
effect is that the underdog, interpreted as a “Beast”, can use the same moral 
arguments to blame the elite for not listening to the views and the needs of the 
“man on the street.” The RRP parties thus aspire to be the only political 
movement that challenges the consensual views of the political establishment, 
which they consider to be not only politically naïve but also morally wrong, 
since they distance themselves from people at large. In this frame, the attraction 
of “the Beast” lies in the incapacity of existing liberal democratic regimes to 
deal with politically incorrect views. This is the taboo frame, which is equally 
strong in Sweden and in Denmark. The correspondent Nathan Shachar writes in 
a chronicle (Dagens Nyheter 25 September 2009):   
 
The most dangerous thing is not failures and difficulties in relation to 
immigration, but the feeling that the politicians, over the voters’ heads, 
withdrew the issue from the agenda and turned it into taboo. In Austria, where 
immigrants are less marginalized than in Sweden, this is what – more than 
any real disasters – paved the way for the FPÖ.  
 
In Denmark, framing Islam as “the Beast” is integrated with the politics of fear 
that extends, intentionally or not, radical Muslim terrorism to all Muslims. The 
association of Islam with terrorism was uppermost inJyllands-Posten’s cartoon 
project and cartoonist Kurt Westergaard’s drawings from at least 1997 to the 
bomb-in-the-turban cartoon of 30 September 2005 and later drawings (Hervik 
2011). According to a Danish bishop, the perception of Islam in Denmark is 
almost entirely negative (Termansen, Berlingske Tidende 19 September 2004). 
 
Not surprisingly more than half of the Danes believe that there is an 
overwhelming probability that Denmark will become the object of terrorism. 
Berlingske Tidende interprets these answers in a heading ‘Increasing fear of 
Muslims and Terror.’ In the same newspaper on the same day a text 
underneath the picture of Pia Kjærsgaard says: ‘Islamists threaten our 
democracy.’ (Politiken 25 September 2004) 
 
The cartoon conflict illustrated the sacred nature of freedom of speech among 
journalists and politicians.We also learned that freedom of speech became a 
lever for anti-Islamic policy and practice – somethingthat was far from the 
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founding fathers’ original vision of using freedom of speech to protect 
vulnerable minorities against power-holders like the state and the press (Bjerre 
2009; Hervik 2011). Today this use of the notion of free speech goes hand in 
hand with the construction of a politically correct taboo, according to which the 
“truth” is hidden from Danish politicians. Appeals during the Muhammad 
cartoon conflict for social responsibility and a more lenient treatment of Muslim 
and other migrants were met with accusations about covering up the true nature 
and danger of the Muslim presence in the country. 
 
In a recent course Hervik held for Scandinavian journalists, this conflict 
appeared as one between Danish and Swedish news journalists. While the 
Danish journalists wanted to indiscriminately publish extremist statements to 
celebrate freedom of speech and democracy, their Swedish counterparts instead 
insisted on their democratic right and professional duty to reject anti-democratic 
radical rhetoric for the sake of preserving democracy and practicinga freedom of 
speech that was socially responsible. The claim of speaking the truth, of calling 
a spade a spade, is a discursive tool that is used by the person who claims to 
know the truth while the opponent is hiding it. The practice of speaking 
straightforwardly has its price, however, as the journalist and author Lena 
Sundström aptly noted: “Biases are not dissolved by being aired in public […] 
But I do not believe one becomes happier by articulating one’s biases. Or, that 
we get rid of biases in this way” (Politiken 17 August 2009). 
 
The taboo frame is adjacent to another common frame in the public date – one 
that suggests that the SD gains electoral ground because the electorate is afraid 
and insecure about what is going on around them. In a debating article,the 
journalist Lars Åberg writes (Göteborgs-Posten 23 August 2009):  
 
Out of the will to help and support, without getting on the wrong side of 
someone, a politicized and moralizing culture of insecurityhas been 
established, which has led to educating public officials in anti-discrimination 
and sighing over the Sweden Democrats instead of takingon the conditions 
that constitute their soil.  
 
In this frame, the progress of the SD in Sweden is understandable due to current 
upheavals in the suburbs, which are directly or indirectly connected to the “new 
multicultural” Sweden that some native-born Swedes are, allegedly, afraid of. 
The message is, then, that these issues need to be recognized as “real” problems. 
Our quantitative measurements indicate that to a great extent people are framed 
as either fairly or very insecure/afraid (93.5 percent in Sweden and 95.1 percent 
in Denmark). This in turn imply an explanation for the problems of racism and 
xenophobia as the product of what e.g. the RPPs would refer to as “mass-
immigration” (see Hellström 2010). This frame, to a lesser extent invoked also 
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in the mainstream press and further radicalized by the RPPs, link presumed high 
rates of criminality and societal disturbances with immigration and the 
acceptance of multi-culturalism in the everyday life of the natives. Nourishing 
nativist appeals, in this way, provide the RPPs with a fertile soil to further 
exploit popular fears and gain electoral fortunes.  
  
A final, less strong, frame concerns the idea that “the Beast” does not only feed 
on people’s fears, but also on a growing feeling of resentment and indifference. 
In this case, however, several commentators blame the mainstream parties for 
nourishing these feelings. Our quantitative measurement does not reveal 
unanimous support for the claim that people are perceived as indifferent to 
politics.21Instead it would seem to be the lack of political vision to spur people’s 
imaginations that is considered as the main problem.In his writings, Niklas 
Ekdal says (Dagens Nyheter 13 September 2009, op-ed):  
 
The progress of the Sweden Democrats is a sign that we have given up, that 
no-one expects it to get any better, but everything is now a zero-sum game 
about a shrinking welfare-cake where one gang of cuckoo kids stands against 
the other.22 
 
Furthermore, the rise of the SD is not considered to be a problem that is 
associated with growing feelings of xenophobia among the Swedish 
electorate.Recent polls actually indicate that Swedes are more pro-immigration 
today than before the general election in 2006, when the SD became an issue of 
public controversy (see Demker 2008). In other words, the SD attractive force 
cannot be explained, solely, by reference to anti-immigration attitudes among 
the population.  However, the framing of public opinion as insecure and afraid 
persists. In the news reporting this perception is also framed as a determinant 
factor for the progress of the DPP and the SD. This is nothing new and is 
certainly not unique to Scandinavian politics.23 
 
                                                          
21   Less than fifty percent of the articles alluded to the view that the people are very or fairly 
indifferent to politics in Sweden. In Denmark seventy five per cent of the articles depicted 
the Danes as either fairly-, or very interested in politics. 
22  The Muhammad crisis (2005/6) led to the Danes being tired of debating Muslims: “As 
many as 61 per cent of the Danes think that Islam and Muslims take up too much room in 
the Danish media” (Politiken 9 May 2009). 
23  In the process of consolidating common asylum- and immigration policies for all the EU 
members states, the European Union Commission sets the agenda for combining “the 
European ideals of solidarity and hospitality” with enhanced efforts to combat e.g., illegal 
immigration; hence, the dual strategy of boosting belonging and securitizing migration. 
This development risks fuelling perceptions that it is the immigrants who are the problem 
(Hellström 2008: 40).  
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In 2009, Anders Fogh Rasmussen stepped down as the Danish prime minister 
and handed over the position to the unproven Lars Løkke Rasmussen. The 
Socialist People’s Party had successfully carried out more restrictive measures 
against migrants and migration policy, which in turn had given it a huge boost at 
the polls. With this boost and the weaker new prime minister, the opposition – 
the Social Democrats and the Socialist People’s Party – began to sense that they 
could possibly form the next government together. That is what perhaps makes 
the construction of “the Beast”, here Islam, attractive. This development goes 
hand in hand with the politics of fear that intensifiedafter 9/11. Although this 
fear has become more and more real, (see Hervik 1999, 2011), it is important to 
stress that fear and insecurity are the long-term results of the contentious efforts 
of political and media entrepreneurs. Today, a widespread popular anti-Islamic 
sentiment towards Islamic culture in Denmark forms the dominant frame and 
reveals the attraction of this Beast.  
 
Final Reflections 
This paper has assessed the fine line between political competitors as regular 
political adversaries and political Beasts. We have shown how the journalistic 
language in the Danish newspapers towards the DPP in Denmark differs from 
that in the Swedish newspapers towards the SD. The DPP might be a foe in 
Danish politics, but the SD is – to a large extent – still “the Beast” in Swedish 
politics, albeit much less in 2009 than in 2004. The dominant frames in the 
Swedish newspapers indicate that “we” (as in “we, the good guys”) need to do 
everything to prevent“the Beast” from entering the national parliament and 
impinging on mainstream politics.   
 
The mainstream – left and right – parties in Denmark continue to approach the 
DPP, bymeans of verbal resistance to the party as extremely nationalistic. 
However, our findings verify the proposition made by e.g., Ellinas (2010) that it 
is harder for the mainstream parties to combat the politics of the political 
newcomer after its initial breakthrough, in this regard to articulate a strong 
counter-position to the DPP. One possible implication of this is that “the Beast” 
in Danish politics is increasingly projected onto the Islam community in 
Denmark, which is said to jeopardize social cohesion in this context. 
Mainstream actors in both Sweden and Denmark tend to justify the use of 
nativist rhetoric to avoid losing votes to the RRP parties and an increased 
support for nativist policies in general.  However, our study suggests that the 
further acceptance of nativist rhetoric feeds the RRP-parties and helps them to 
grow stronger. Furthermore, even if our results verify Ellinas’ claim that the 
media’s role subsides in relation to the political newcomer as its organizational 
capabilities and internal party cohesion become more relevant, this is not the 
whole story. The media also plays a significant role in attributing validity to the 
Islam-critical stances of the DPP after its initial breakthrough. In this regard the 
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Danish media provides opportunities for the DPP to capitalize on popularized 
demands for opposition to Islamism (and also Islam) in order to gain electoral 
support.   
 
“The Beast” represents some kind of archaic force that challenges the stability of 
representative politics,which for some voters is considered too technocratic and 
perhaps also too dull.24According to Chantal Mouffe, the RRP party family – as 
representing this archaic force – is the only movement that challenges the status 
quo (Mouffe 2005: 69-70). Some five years after the publication of Mouffe’s 
book “On the Political”, these parties are no longer referred to as extreme, but as 
radical populists. We have also seen how RRP parties in e.g., Denmark occupy 
an established, yet controversial position in domestic politics. In addition, the 
language of fear, commonly invoked in the DPP rhetoric, is now common goods 
in the news-reporting repertoire. One explanation why this development has 
gone further in Denmark is that legitimate actors in the public debate have 
adopted the language of the DPP. This is not the case in Sweden; at least not to 
the same extent. Both the DPP and the SD, though heavily criticized, tend to set 
the tone in the partisan rivalry over national identity issues.  
 
The DPP and the SD test the limits of freedom of speech by means of vulgar 
proposals or election films25 that stigmatize the Muslim minority population. 
They do not always succeed of course, and verbal resistance is often 
strong.Despite this, however, the anti-Islamic discourse continues to grow. The 
socio-cultural shift has triggered political movements and parties to mobilize 
supporters along contradictory ideas. On the one side, these ideas champion 
cultural diversity and a progressive life-style. On the other side, there are 
movements that seek refuge in solid hierarchies and, ultimately, resist the 
blending of “cultures” - as these are interpreted as impermeable.  
 
                                                          
24  Margaret Canovan (1999) elaborates on populism as a permanent feature of democratic 
politics, a ‘shadow cast by democracy’.  Following Canovan, representative politics is 
ambivalent and split between the redemptive ambitions of fulfilling demands of popular 
sovereignty and the pragmatic ambitions to maintain solid institutions. Certainly, fascist 
leaders in history have benefited from the redemptive side of democratic politics. But also 
in mature democratic systems redemptive politics gains attraction in political systems that 
are (too) biased towards pragmatic politics; hence, when politics is reduced to 
technocracy and reduced to the equal distribution of goods and resources, this might not 
have a take on peoples’ imaginations and emotions and thus potentially pave the way for 
new political contesters.  
25  The Swedish channel (TV 4) first refused to broadcast the SD election campaign film that 
showed burqa-wearing women with pushing prams and chasing an elderly ‘native-
looking’ person. However TV4 changed its mind and instead broadcast a slightly adjusted 
election film before the 2010 national elections. If anything this turmoil accredited the SD 
with additional media exposure.  
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The nature of “the Beast” has shifted, though, from the evil extremist on the 
right side of the political spectrum to an emphasis on social cohesion, cultural 
congruence and a pre-occupation with how people migrating from non-western 
countries might jeopardize community stability. In the debate about the DPP and 
the SD in the media,“the Beast” shows two different faces in Denmark and 
Sweden respectively. In Denmark, non-western migrants are framed as some 
kind of existential threat that endangers the survival of the national community 
(cf.Huysmans 2001), which enables the “good guys” to mobilize against poorly 
integrated immigrants as morally evil, alternatively culturally determined 
victims. In Sweden, the SD represents a threat to the endemic perception of 
Sweden as a tolerant, non-xenophobic political community. The “good 
democrats” in Sweden thus present a positive self-image of Sweden as tolerant 
and open-minded, in a spirit of colour-blindness, as they mirror themselves 
against SD nationalism as hostile and malignant.  One could also say that we are 
confronted with a two-faced Beast that feeds on perceptions of the people as 
ultimately afraid of what are not recognized as native goods.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Media coverage of Sverigedemokraterna (SD) in Mediearkivet (2010) from 1997 to 
2009. The Social Democrats (S) and the Christian Democrats (KD) are included for 
the sake of comparability.  
 
 
Media coverage of the Danish People’s Party[depicted in the diagram as Dansk 
Folkeparti] in Infomedia from 1997 to 2009. The Social Democrats (Socialdemokratiet 
1997-2002; Socialdemokraterne 2003-2009) and the Conservative Party [depicted in 
the diagram as De Konservative] are included for the sake of comparability 
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Appendix 2: Coding Scheme (Sweden, Denmark follows the same pattern) 
 
Variable 
Number 
Variable Values 
1 Year 2004 
2009 
2 Month 1-12 
3 Day 1-31 
4 News Paper 1 EXP 
2 DN 
3 SvD 
4 AFT 
5 GP 
5 Article Size 1 Small 
2 Medium 
3 Large 
6 Author 1 Journalist 
2 Editorial writer 
3 Independent writer (e.g., guest columnist, 
journalist/author) 
4 Other (e.g., researcher, politician…) 
7  Genre 1 News article 
2 Chronicle (also reportage and column like 
articles) 
3 Editorial 
4 Op-eds/letters to the editor (both “DN-
Debatt” and common letterstotheeditor) 
5 News item 
8 Section 1 News Section 
2 Domestic (can be coded as 1) 
3 Editorial 
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4 Cultural Section 
5 Other 
9  Arena 1 Sweden-Domestic 
2 Sweden-EU 
3 EU/Europe 
4 Sweden-Other (e.g., Sweden-Denmark) 
10  The SD is 
different/similar in 
relation to the other 
domestic parties 
1 Very similar 
2 fairly similar 
3 Neutral both/and (neither/nor) similar and 
different 
4 fairly different 
5 Very different 
11 The SD (tone) 1 Very negative/alarming threat/made fun of 
2 Negative 
3 Neutral (neither negative nor positive) 
4 Positive 
5 Very Positive 
12 People (in general) are 
afraid/insecure - secure 
People are very secure (not afraid at all) 
People are fairly secure 
Neutral  - people are both secure and insecure 
People are fairly insecure 
People are very insecure  
13 People (actual or 
potential) who vote for 
the SD are 
afraid/insecure-secure 
See 12 
14 People (in general) are 
positive/negative to 
immigration 
People are very positive to 
immigration/multiculturalism 
People are fairly positive to 
immigration/multiculturalism  
Neutral 
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People are fairly negative to positive to 
immigration/multiculturalism  
People are very negative to positive to 
immigration/multiculturalism  
15 People (actual or 
potential) who vote for 
the SD are against 
immigration 
 
(same as 14) 
16 People (in general) are 
positive/negative of the 
establishment 
People are very positive to the establishment 
(the established order/established values) 
People are fairly positive to the establishment 
(the established order/established values) 
Neutral   
People are fairly negative to the establishment 
(the established order/established values) 
People are very negative to the establishment 
(the established order/established values) 
17 People (the actual or 
potential) who vote for 
the SD are 
positive/negative of the 
establishment 
(same as 16) 
18 People (in general) are 
indifferent/anti-
political – interested in 
politics 
People are very interested in politics 
People are fairly interested in politics 
Neutral 
People are fairly indifferent to politics 
People are very indifferent to politics (anti-
political, do not care at all) 
19 People (actual or 
potential) who vote for 
the SD are 
(same as 18) 
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indifferent/anti-
political – interested in 
politics 
20 People are different 
(the natives are (not) 
like the non-natives). 
E.g., the immigrants do 
not behave/think/act 
like the natives.  
The natives are very much like the non-natives 
The natives are fairly (to some extent) like the 
non-natives 
neutral 
The natives are fairly different from the non-
natives 
The natives are very different from the non-
natives 
21 The potential or actual 
SD voters are (not) like 
the average voters  
The potential or actual SD voters are very 
much like the average voter 
The potential or actual SD voters are fairly like 
the average SD voters 
Neutral 
The potential or actual SD voters are fairly 
different from the average voters 
The potential or actual SD voters are very 
different from the average voters 
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